Adam Wainwright is an all-time great St. Louis Cardinals pitcher who needs adult supervision. This is especially true in high-stakes games. Manager Mike Shildt has shown he lacks the leadership chops to provide that adult supervision. And on Saturday at Busch Stadium, Shildt’s passivity cost the Cardinals dearly.
After putting together an average-ish cocktail of a season that was one part elite-at-home and one part awful-on-the-road, Shildt made the good decision to set Wainwright up to start NLDS Game 3 at Busch Stadium against the Braves. After staff ace Jack Flaherty shut down the Braves in a lopsided Game 5 victory, fortune smiled on the Redbirds when the Nationals knocked off the Dodgers, giving St. Louis the home-field field advantage in the NLCS and the ability to start Wainwright twice at home, if need be.
Game 2 at Busch pitted Wainwright again perhaps the best pitcher in the National League, Max Scherzer. And while Waino may not have matched Scherzer, who carried a no-hitter into the sixth, the former Cardinals ace more than held his own in the duel, allowing one run on a homer through seven innings. This is when Shildt engaged in the indefensible: Mathenaging.
Former Cardinals manager Mike Matheny could not manage Wainwright either. Whether it’s a lack of smarts or over abundance of sentimentality, Matheny consistently left Waino in too long. He would do it when it was obvious Wainwright was injured, when it was obvious he was out of gas, or when basic managing tactics dictated removal. Shildt subscribes to the Matheny Manifesto chapter on (not) managing Wainwright. And Saturday at Busch was the third reminder of this fact since the season’s final weekend against Chicago.
The Cardinals bats had no solution for Scherzer. For the second consecutive game, the offense looked completely overmatched against Washington. They could barely muster a hit let alone a run. To say that runs were at a premium as Game 2 entered the late innings is an understatement.
The Cards trailed 1-0 entering the 8th inning. Even the feeble Cards offense might be able to scrape together one run against the Washington bullpen, which was a disaster during the season. Shildt should have been managing aggressively to keep any other Nats from crossing the plate. That was the Cards’ best shot at somehow coming back and stealing a victory.
Shildt stuck with Waino to face the strikeout-prone Micchael A. Taylor and it worked. Wainwright K’d the free swinger for the first out. Up next was Scherzer, who the Nats predictably removed for a pinch-hitter in the form of left-handed hitter Matt “Big May” Adams. Here is where Shildt went overboard with sentimentality.
Shildt did not use platoon splits to make his decision, as the following tables make clear.
2019 Platoon Splits for Adam Wainwright
There was a time when Wainwright was an ace who get batters out regardless of which batter’s box they dug into. That time is gone. Wainwright’s aging arm doesn’t allow him to pitch like he once did. And while he fades, pitchers across the league are emerging with nastier and nastier arsenals. Wainwright essentially has one above-average pitch and that’s his plus curve. And while it can be effective against a left-handed batsman, it’s undeniably more potent against righties.
Career Platoon Splits for Matt Adams
It’s rather remarkable how Adams and Wainwright’s platoon splits mirror one another. Waino is about as bad against left-handed hitters as Adams is against left-handed relievers. Put otherwise, letting the right-handed Wainwright face the left-handed Adams is about as favorable a matchup for the Nationals as possible. Yet that’s the matchup Shildt chose for the Cardinals.
The result of Shildt’s bad choice was as predictable as it gets in baseball. Adams reached base. Although the single was probably a best-case scenario given the amount of damage lefties have hit for against Waino this year.
Shildt did not relieve the fading veteran after he predictably allowed Adams to reach. Perhaps he was heartened by the fact that Adams only hit a single, even if the single was a sharply struck 101.8 mph off the bat. Shildt let Wainwright face Trea Turner, a righty, who singled weakly.
Adam Eaton, a left-handed hitter, was due up. Eaton hits righties about as well as lefties for his career, so the batter’s platoon splits did not dictate a change. But Shildt still had Waino’s platoon splits to consider and the situation. Shildt’s faith in the Matheny Manesto chapter on managing Wainwright remained unfazed. He stuck with the Proven Veteran. Eaton laced a 102.7 mph ball off the bat that shot past the diving Paul Goldschmidt and plated two runs, pushing the Nats’ lead to 3-0.
Shildt ordered the intentional walk of Anthony Rendon. He then removed Wainwright. Presumably because the principles of Mathenaging dictate removal of Wainwright only after the team’s changes of winning have been kneecapped.
There is no denying that Shildt is a marked upgrade over Matheny. The Cardinals won the division in no small part because of the improvements on defense and running bases due to Shildt’s approach to the game. But when it comes to in-game managing, the question of whether Shild is an improvement over Matheny is unanswered.
A manager’s job is to put his players in a chance to succeed, which helps the team’s chances to win. Shildt set Wainwright up to fail in Game 2, just as he did in NLDS Game 3 after doing the same thing in NLDS Game 3. Shildt put the opposition—not the Cardinals—in the best position to succeed. The Nationals took advantage of Shildt’s gift in a way the Braves couldn’t.
The Cards managed to luck into a run in the bottom of the eighth. But it wasn’t enough. They lost 3-1. The Nats’ two-run 8th proved decisive.
We’ll never know what might have happened if Shildt had pulled Wainwright earlier. And that’s the problem. Shildt’s adherence to the “let the starter lose the game” tenant of Mathenaging set up Wainwright, and by extension the Cardinals, to fail. By letting Wainwright give up two runs, Shildt cost the Cardinals a chance to win the game.
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