Adam Wainwright needs adult supervision

A grown-up needs to manage Adam Wainwright.

The declining St. Louis Cardinals starter is made of glass. His sinew and muscle is brittle. The only person who seems unable to recognize and accept this fact is Wainwright himself. And, I suppose, the manager of the Cardinals, regardless of who that person is.

A pattern has emerged. Wainwright will notice something is wrong physically with his body. He will nonetheless continue to pitch. The injury will hurt his ability to pitch. The subpar pitching will result in the Cardinals giving up runs.

The latest piece of evidence comes from Sunday night’s loss at Wrigley Field, as relayed by stltoday.com writer Derrick Goold:

With two out in the fifth inning and the offense famished for runs, Wainwright felt he needed to get to second base on his line drive to left-center. He needed to pitch deep into Sunday’s game with the bullpen on fumes, and because the Cardinals oh, so desperately needed a win at Wrigley. Wainwright’s hamstring sprung a few steps out of the batter’s box, was sore as he slid into second, and when he tried to pitch through it, the game came undone, too. Wainwright said he could generate the same life on his pitches with his landing leg compromised. Three of the first four hitters he faced in the inning got hits, and the fourth was starter Kyle Hendricks, who dropped a bunt. Dave Bote’s RBI single snapped the tie and Kyle Schwarber’s RBI double pushed the Cubs comfortably ahead.

In the span of four batters, Wainwright’s hamstring didn’t improve and a 1-1 game became a 3-1 deficit.

“It just change[d] the whole complexion of the game, I think,” Wainwright said.

You think? After the fact? After all of the other times pitching injured, ostensibly playing the hero, hurt the Cardinals’ chances at winning? You think?

The better question is why manager Mike Shildt didn’t think of what would happen and make the decision for Wainwright.

There’s a new manager in St. Louis, but the result is the same. It seems that Cardinals managers are more interested in worshipping at the altar of Wainwright’s veteran proveyness than managing the fading star. Whether it’s Mike Matheny or Shildt, the result is the same. The St. Louis manager will allow Wainwright to play hurt.

Wainwright gets what Wainwright wants. It does not matter how it hurts the Cardinals’ chances at winning. It’s apparent that no one is able to make the adult decision for Wainwright — that he should not pitch in meaningful games for the Cards if he is physically compromised. Wainwright pitching at less than 100% hurts the Cards’ chances at winning, especially nowadays with the righty in the twilight of his career, doing all he can to be serviceable as a back-of-the-rotation starter in a game that has passed him by.

Worse still is how an injury can snowball. The injury to the part of the body that is hurting can worsen with use. Another possibility is for the injured body part to cause the player to sustain an injury elsewhere in his body due to compensating for the injured body party.

All of this is to say that there is no reason for Wainwright to play the hero, especially in 2019. His injury history is long. Waino’s body is not capable of pitching like it once was, due in no small part to his past injuries. And the 2019 Cards need every inning of quality pitching they can get.

It’s apparent that management does not see things this way. After all, Shildt declared the Cards to have five No. 1 starters in spring training when they might have one No. 3 starter, a handful of 4th and 5th starter types and Michael Wacha, who doesn’t merit a roster spot let alone tonight’s start against Miami. (Sure, the opponent is bad, but these Cards are clawing for any win they can notch and Wacha hamstrings those efforts considerably.)

With each chapter in the injury-ridden decline of Wainwright’s career it becomes clearer. There is no adult in Cardinals management who is capable of leading when it comes to the once-great Waino. Sunday night is the latest example of how the inability to manage Wainwright harms — all too often irreparably — the Cardinals’ chances of winning. This dynamic needs to change. Waino needs adult supervision.

Craig Kimbrel, Greg Holland, and the risky pursuit of free-agent relievers

The Chicago Cubs announced on Wednesday a contract with veteran reliever Craig Kimbrel for 3 years and $43 million. The Cubs’ decision to sign Kimbrel immediately brought to mind the Cardinals’ decision last March to sign veteran reliever Greg Holland. Both relievers have the veteran proveyness prized by managers such as Mike Matheny and Joe Maddon. Both relievers struggled to find a taker in the free-agent market. And both closers were past their primes when they hit free agency.

Entering the 2018 season, the Cards did not need Holland to close out games. The move was driven primarily by Matheny, who needed the crutch of a Closer to get the final three outs. If Holland had pitched the way he was projected to pitch, the righty would not have made the Cards appreciably better.

There was no reason to expect Holland to pitch as badly as he did. The Cards had every reason to believe that he would be perfectly fine. And if your manager requires the crutch of a Closer to work the 9th inning, giving him a perfectly fine reliever on a one-year deal is ideal. As it worked out, Holland joined St. Louis after a 10-day stint in the minors and was a stink bomb that stunk so badly that the signing challenged the long-espoused conventional wisdom that there is no such thing as a bad one-year contract.

Holland, and Matheny’s slavish devotion to his veteran proveyness, combined to be a factor in the Cardinals failing to make the postseason last year. The Cards finished 2 1/2 games back of the Rockies for the second wild-card berth. Holland tallied three blown saves for the Cards and two pitching “losses.” Had the Cardinals not made the “win-now” move of signing Holland, the season might very well have turned out differently. But St. Louis did sign Holland to handle ninth, the veteran pitched horribly, and the Cards missed the postseason for the third straight autumn.

This is not to say that Kimbrel will be for the Cubs what Holland was for the Cardinals. Holland entering April 2018 was not as good a pitcher as Kimbrel is entering July 2019. There is very little reason to expect Kimbrel to blow up the way that Holland did. Kimbrel is better now than Holland was then, which is why Kimbrel’s contract is for three years and $43 million while Holland’s was just one year, $13 million.

But how much better? That depends on what one makes of Kimbrel’s 2018. Kimbrel’s October struggles have been poo-pooed. But 2018 was the worst season of his career. And it’s not particularly close.

Craig Kimbrel:  2011–18

Year	IP	K%	BB%	ERA	FIP	xFIP	fWAR
2011	77	41.5	10.5	2.10	1.52	1.94	2.8
2012	62.2	50.2	6.1	1.01	0.78	0.88	3.1
2013	67	38.0	7.8	1.21	1.93	1.95	2.2
2014	61.2	38.9	10.7	1.61	1.83	2.24	2.5
2015	59.1	36.4	9.2	2.58	2.68	2.46	1.3
2016	53	37.7	13.6	3.40	2.92	3.48	1.2
2017	69	49.6	5.5	1.43	1.42	1.50	3.2
2018	62.1	38.9	12.6	2.74	3.13	3.13	1.3

Kimbrel’s two worst seasons occurred in 2016 and 2018. They are still very good, and he sandwiched them with a sterling 2017. Nonetheless, when you consider that he is entering his age-31 season, it’s not hard to deduce that 2016 and 2018 are likely indicative of the start of his decline. And that’s without even factoring in his weird postseason last October.

And so Kimbrel’s age and his most recent season’s worth of performance combine to create a grain of salt that must be ingested when reading that the veteran is a Hall-of-Famer, the greatest closer since Mariano Rivera, or one of the best relievers of his generation. While such statements are undeniably true — just look at those stats while pitching for the Braves! — they are more true about the Kimbrel that was than the Kimbrel that is.

Kimbrel was available as a free agent in June because every organization is Major League Baseball recognizes that the best of Kimbrel is in the past and the future is murky. The number of flamethrowers working their way up through the minors nowadays probably played a part as well. Why pay a premium for a past-his-prime Kimbrel when relievers who can roughly approximate his performance are within the organization right now? That’s why no team came close to offering the $100 million Kimbrel was reportedly seeking this winter. And it’s why the Cubs were able to ink the righty to a three-year contract for $43 million.

Further muddying the waters of Kimbrel expectations is the question of his MLB readiness, with Holland as a cautionary tale. St. Louis signed Holland on March 31. The veteran joined the Cardinals bullpen on April 9, after ten days tuning up in the minors. Holland then joined the Cardinals bullpen on April 9 and pitched terribly. So bad that St. Louis cut bait on him mid-season.

Following the Cardinals’ release of Holland, he signed with the Nationals and pitched well. Holland then parlayed his success in Washington into a contract with Arizona this past offseason. And Holland has pitched very well for the D-Backs this season. With the benefit of hindsight, it’s fair to speculate that Holland would have pitched better for St. Louis had he spent more time in Florida before joining the big-league bullpen.

The Cubs and Kimbrel would be wise to avoid a similar unforced error to that committed by the Cards and Holland a year ago. That’s probably why Maddon has floated three weeks as the timeframe in comments to the media. Though there’s no indication that Kimbrel has agreed with that amount of time. Even with three weeks of prep time, Kimbrel and the Cubs are in uncharted waters.

Then there’s the elephant in the room:  What if Kimbrel joins the Cubs and pulls a Holland? The Cardinals only had to stomach eating $13 million last year when they released Holland. The idea of doing so was so unappetizing that they allowed Holland to be a burden on the big-league roster for too long in the hopes that he might right the ship.

The Cubs have guaranteed Kimbrel $43 million. It’s unclear what the organization’s appetite will be for eating any portion of that salary if Kimbrel doesn’t deliver for Chicago the way that he did for his prior three clubs. Maddon may have to manage his bullpen with an expensive and ineffective reliever occupying a roster spot for an indefinite period of time.

Even if the worst outcomes are avoided, what have the Cubs achieved? The Cubs signed Kimbrel to give Maddon a reliever for the 9th inning with the type of veteran proveyness Baseball Men cherish in a Closer. I suppose the Kimbrel brand Closer gives management and fans some peace of mind, which isn’t nothing.

And if Kimbrel pitches up to reasonable expectations for his Age 31 through 33 seasons, he’ll be a fine closer. Having the Kimbrel of 2016 and 2018 over Reliever X in the 9th might make a difference in a game or two this year, and perhaps a few more in 2020 and 2021. If Kimbrel recreates the nastiness of his peak seasons, the benefit isn’t much greater. All of this is to say that, if all goes according to plan, it seems that the Cubs paid a premium for a de minimus upgrade this year and beyond. Even if the Central continues to be as competitive as it has been so far this year, it sure looks like the Cubs deployed their payroll dry powder on the smallest roster improvement possible.

St. Louis Cardinals Trade Gossip: What type of starting pitcher will they target?

The St. Louis Cardinals rotation has been bad. The weakest link is 2013 October hero Michael Wacha, who the Cardinals banished to the bullpen and probably should designate for assignment. The Wacha demotion leaves an opening in the rotation that the club could fill externally by signing a free agent like Dallas Keuchel or by trade. A starting pitcher is the Cardinals’ most obvious need as we head into trade-rumor season.

Derrick Goold of stltoday.com participated in a recent chat and responded to a question about Keuchel in a way that helped frame the Cardinals’ approach to upgrading the rotation:

What the Cardinals aren’t sure of is what Keuchel they’d get. Is he the lefty who won the Cy Young and was one of the game’s best groundball-getters, or is he more like the recent trend as the stuff has faded a bit and he’s not the pitcher he once was. Here’s how I’ve had it explained to me, in more tangible terms:  The Cardinals would be intrigued by adding a 4.0 WAR pitcher to the rotation. Is Keuchel there? He was, not too long ago. Can he be again? Is Bumgarner? And so on. What the Cardinals are measuring that against is cost -- they don’t want a 4.0 WAR salary for a 2.0 WAR pitcher, for example -- and whether they can, in aggregate, get the same production from their committee of young pitchers, which is now Cabrera and could be Reyes, Gomber, Wacha, and Ponce de Leon at some point, If they think that group can provide, in total, a greater contribution, they’ll go that route.

To summarize, the Cardinals front office does not want to pay for veteran proveyness. They don’t want to add a name just to add a name. The Cards want to add skill in a way that will amount to a tangible upgrade over what they have in house. And apparently the club sets 4.0 WAR as the bar to clear for such an upgrade. That’s a number that feels about right, being above what one could reasonably expect from the group of internal starters the organization has.

So, what is a 4.0-WAR pitcher?

I’m going to use Fangraphs WAR, which focuses more on pitcher performance than rWAR, which Baseball-Reference uses and focuses more on runs allowed (which inherently muddies the waters a bit with fielding performance). We also know that the Cardinals tend to give greater weight to advanced metrics than traditional ERA when assessing pitchers. The following table contains the starters that posted 2.9 or more fWAR in 2018 (in order to include Zack Greinke and Dallas Keuchel). I’ve highlighted in red the starters that I think could realistically be available in the trade market this year.

2018 Starting Pitcher fWAR Leaderboard

SP	IP	ERA	FIP	xFIP	fWAR
Jacob deGrom	217	1.70	1.99	2.60	9.0
Max Scherzer	220.2	2.53	2.65	3.06	7.4
Justin Verlander	214	2.52	2.78	3.03	6.7
Chris Sale	158	2.11	1.98	2.31	6.2
Gerrit Cole	200.1	2.88	2.70	3.04	6.0
Patrick Corbin	200	3.15	2.47	2.61	5.9
Trevor Bauer	171.1	2.26	2.44	3.14	5.7
Luis Severino	191.1	3.39	2.95	3.10	5.5
Corey Kluber	215	2.89	3.12	3.08	5.5
Aaron Nola	212.1	2.37	3.01	3.21	5.4
Carlos Carrasco	186.2	3.33	2.98	2.92	5.0
Blake Snell	180.2	1.89	2.95	3.16	4.8
Miles Mikolas	200.2	2.83	3.28	3.67	4.3
Zack Wheeler	182.1	3.31	3.25	3.81	4.2
Mike Clevinger	200	3.02	3.52	3.86	4.2
German Marquez	196	3.77	3.40	3.10	4.2
Kyle Freeland	202.1	2.85	3.67	4.22	4.2
Noah Syndergaard	154.1	3.03	2.80	3.29	4.2
James Tallion	191	3.20	3.46	3.58	3.8
Mike Foltynewicz	183	2.85	3.37	3.77	3.8
James Paxton	160.1	3.76	3.24	3.02	3.7
Kyle Hendricks	199	3.44	3.78	3.87	3.5
Marco Gonzales	166.2	4.00	3.43	3.59	3.5
Dallas Keuchel	204.2	3.74	3.69	3.84	3.3
Clayton Kershaw	161.1	2.73	3.19	3.19	3.3
Jose Berrios	192.1	3.84	3.90	3.89	3.3
Walker Buehler	136.1	2.31	2.92	3.15	3.2
J.A. Happ	177.2	3.65	3.98	3.88	3.0
Zack Greinke	207.2	3.21	3.71	3.44	2.9

This method is admittedly flawed. One year of 3.0+ fWAR does not mean a pitcher’s true talent is that high or low. I used this as a quick-and-dirty method of illustrating just what the Cards are after and showing where some potential targets fit within that context. It’s intended to give us a better understanding of the lay of the land the Cards are attempting to navigate.

Keuchel and Greinke are brand name workhorse aces who are past their respective primes. Though still good major-league starters, the cost of adding either will be at a premium given their anticipated production, which is lower than it was. Throw in Madison Bumgarner (who merits a post of his own) and it’s easy to understand why the Cards would want to avoid the veteran proveyness price tag associated with a projected performance on par with what the Cards can expect from a Reyes or Gomber.

Looking at this list, the best fit is Scherzer because he is one of the best pitchers in baseball and is therefore the best fit on any team. This is even more true for the Cards, with their weak rotation and Scherzer’s Missouri roots. The complication, which has been well documented in the media, is Scherzer’s complex contract, which includes a lot of deferred money in order to help Washington avoid the luxury tax.

The more realistic fit in terms of cost, performance, and clubhouse fit would be Corey Kluber but for his broken arm. Given Kluber’s injured-list status, it’s now Trevor Bauer, who has posted 1.4 fWAR through play on June 4 with a 3.87 ERA, 4.08 FIP, and 4.47 xFIP while starting in the DH league. Cleveland’s rough season to date likely means they will be looking to get rid of expensive players such as Bauer, who is earning $13 million this season and has one more year of club control after 2019, while reloading. This is not to say that Bauer, with his personality, doesn’t present clubhouse questions — just that his combination of club control and talent is right in line with the Cards’ framework for bolstering their rotation and the types of moves the organization has made in the past. Moreover, the trade mechanics will be much easier to work out than they would be with the Scherzer contract.