How worrisome are Adam Wainwright's splits?

Adam Wainwright agreed to a one-year contract with the St. Louis Cardinals with a guaranteed $5 million base salary and provisions allowing for up to $5 million more in incentives. Wainwright reportedly was willing to a sign a one-year deal only with the Cardinals. He left a fair amount of money on the table to pitch in St. Louis for another year. Given the righty’s home-road splits last season, one might understand why. Which made me wonder how big the gap was between Wainwright’s pitching at Busch Stadium and on the road.

As a Cardinals fan, you’ve likely heard about Wainwright’s home-road splits. Specifically, how much higher is road ERA was in 2019 than his home ERA. That’s because the gap is quite large. Waino had a 2.56 home ERA and a 6.22 away ERA. Gap? More like canyon.

Despite its flaws, ERA is still a stat of prominence. Defense and scorekeeping inject noise into the stat, so that is not entirely reflective of the pitcher’s individual performance in a given game. So while I still consider ERA, it’s more of a starting point than the end-all, be-all of pitching stats for me.

I like to use Field Independent Pitching (FIP), too, because it focuses on strikeouts, walks, and home runs allowed. These are three things that have far less to do with the fielders and official scorekeeper. They are areas of the game that more reflective of the pitcher’s individual performance (though the catcher, umpire, and occasional fielder will influence them). xFIP takes things a step further by substituting the league-average home run rate for the individual pitcher’s home run rate to illustrate the regression one might expect.

ERA suggests that Wainwright pitched far better at home than on the road. But do the peripherals support this conclusion? The following table includes the component stats of FIP and xFIP.

Wainwright 2019:  Home vs. Road

Split	IP	K%	BB%	LOB%	BABIP	ERA	FIP	xFIP
Home	95.0	21.0	7.8	87.7	.299	2.56	4.02	4.17
Road	76.2	20.0	9.6	65.4	.344	6.22	4.77	4.67
Diff	-18.1	-1.0	+1.8	-22.3	+.045	+3.66	+0.75	+0.50

There is no denying that Waino pitched better at Busch than he did on the road. He struck out batters at a slightly higher rate. He walked batters at a lower rate as well. But the difference is far lower than one would expect after looking at his ERA platoon split. The ERA difference of 3.66 is gigantic, while the FIP (0.75) and xFIP (0.50) are far smaller.

We also know that FIP and xFIP are better predictors of future ERA than ERA. That is to say that a pitcher is more likely to post a future ERA closer to his FIP or xFIP than his ERA. Applying this knowledge to Wainwright, he is likely to have better runs-allowed results on the road and worse runs-allowed results at home in 2020 than he did in 2019.

Wainwright’s ERA-FIP gap at home is -1.46 and +1.45 on the road. Based on his strikeouts, walks, and homers allowed, it’s fair to say that Wainwright was about as lucky at Busch as he was unlucky on the road when it came to earned runs allowed. While the future Cardinals Hall-of-Famer pitched better at home than on the road, the difference in his performance was nowhere near as extreme as his ERA split suggests.

Further illuminating why this might be are the rates at which balls in play against the veteran righty resulted in hits and how many base runners crossed the plate.

Each year, MLB averages about a .300 Batting Average on Balls In Play (BABIP). Wainwright held opponents to a BABIP at Busch that was about average, but his road BABIP was far higher. It’s fair to expect that to even out in 2020 so that his road BABIP is closer to .300 than, say, .350.

Fangraphs calculates Left On Base Percentage (LOB%) for pitchers. Typically, 75% is about average. We see that Wainwright was far more successful (some might say lucky) at leaving ducks on the pond when pitching in St. Louis (87.7 LOB%) than on the road (65.4 LOB%). It’s likely that Wainwright’s LOB% at home and on the road will be closer to 75% in 2020. This will reduce his ERA splits.

Too often regression is used as a synonym for “get worse.” But Wainwright’s home and road splits show how regression is a two-way street. We have good reason to believe that Wainwright’s home ERA will regress by going up so that it is closer to his FIP and xFIP and his road ERA will regress by going down so that it is closer to his FIP and xFIP.

We have no reason to believe that he will allow so few runs at Busch Stadium or so many runs on the road. Instead, it seems likely that he will be good at home and slightly worse on the road. In 2020, it’s likely that Waino will once again be an average-ish MLB starter.

The split that Cardinals fans should be more concerned about is how badly Wainwright pitched against lefties as compared to righties. Due to the fact that Wainwright’s curveball is his only above-average MLB offering nowadays, this fact probably shouldn’t be surprising. But what may strike you is just how much better left-handed batsmen performed against the righty than right-handed hitters.

Wainwright 2019:  LHB vs. RHB

Split	TBF	K%	BB%	BA	OBP	SLG	ISO	wOBA
RHB	402	22.6	4.7	.262	.310	.389	.127	.297
LHB	343	18.1	13.1	.288	.380	.503	.215	.368
Diff	-59	-4.5	+8.4	+.016	+.070	+.114	+.088	+.071

Wainwright was effective against same-handed batters. But lefties hit him very hard. Perhaps because of how lefties hit for power against him, Wainwright issued walks at a Michael Wacha-esque rate against portside hitters last season. Add the walks and power together, and lefties were lethal against Wainwright last season.

All of this is to say that Wainwright will likely pitch better on the road in 2020 than he did in 2019 and worse at home. But the net effect should even out with respect to his overall performance. Waino’s home-road splits are not cause for much concern.

The splits that are worrisome, however, are Wainwright’s against lefties. It’s a chicken-or-the-egg dynamic when it comes to the interplay between the robust power they displayed against the righty and the walks that he issued. Regardless, Waino’s lefty-righty splits should cause fans far more concerning than his home-road splits.

David Ross is not Mike Matheny

David Ross is not Mike Matheny.

Matheny is a former big-league catcher. Ross is a former MLB catcher. Both were highly regarded clubhouse leaders during their playing days. Matheny worked for the St. Louis Cardinals before being hired as manager and Ross worked for the Chicago Cubs (and ESPN) before throwing his hat in the ring for the Cubs’ manager job. Both former players had close relationships with the front office before pursuing the MLB manager job for the organization.

The 2011 Cardinals won the World Series and St. Louis was expected to compete for the division title in 2012 and beyond. While the 2019 Cubs failed to make the postseason, they are expected to compete for the division title in 2020 and beyond. The 2012 Cardinals had and the 2020 Cubs will have rosters deep in talent and postseason experience. Matheny inherited and Ross inherits expectations for postseason success from within their respective organizations and fans.

Managing adults I hard. Maintaining their respect while doing so is harder. Matheny was bad at managing people and this is one of the reasons the Cardinals fired him. It remains to be seen whether Ross will be good at managing people because, as best I can tell, he has never done it before.

Ross has never managed or coached at any level. Matheny coached a traveling children’s baseball team. So Matheny had more experience managing a baseball team on the day the St. Louis Cardinals hired him to manage their MLB club than Ross has on the day he becomes the Chicago Cubs manager.

Matheny wrote a manifesto while in the job of children’s ball coach. The Matheny Manifesto forbid questioning the manager. To Matheny, a probable fascist, the manager is right even when he was wrong. In other words, Matheny was never wrong in his own mind. As an anonymous Cardinals organization employee told once told Bernie Miklasz, Matheny only looks in the mirror to comb his hair.

Matheny made clear that being a so-called clubhouse leader as a player is a lot different than being the manager. Having the respect of your teammates requires a different skillset than maintaining their respect as the manager. It’s one thing to offer insight to the pitching coach or manager about how a pitcher is looking in the middle innings. It’s another thing entirely to make the decision to remove the pitcher from the game and communicate that decision to the pitcher.

Being a manager is completely different from being a player-leader. No player makes the decision about another player’s playing time. The manager makes the decisions about every player’s playing time. Those decisions impact a player’s salary and their career.

A good manager must be able to make sound strategic and tactical decisions. But that’s only part of what a good manager does. After arriving at a decision, the manager must be able to communicate the decision to the players it impacts in a way they understand and that respects them as adults and professionals. The best managers do this and maintain their players’ respect even after giving them potentially bad news. It’s fair to say that the most important parts of the managers job are those fans rarely, if ever, see.

No one knew how Matheny would perform in the area of leadership, though his history as a revered catcher was cited to as evidence that he would excel. And for several years, his leadership was trumpeted in the media as a strength. But the veneer slowly cracked and it became clear that Matheny wasn’t good at anything.

Matheny was bad at communicating with his players. He played favorites (remember “Mike guys”?). Matheny was loathe to delegate to his coaches. He couldn’t instill fundamentals in his players as a teacher. All of that came out toward or after the end of his tenure as Cardinals manager. It made fans wonder why Matheny, who proved himself over and over again a terrible strategist and tactician, kept his job as long as he did.

No one knows how Ross will perform as manager of the Cubs, especially when it comes to managing his former friends and current Cubs. Will there be Grandpa Rossy guys (Rossy grandchildren)? How will he handle strategic and tactical decisions? Will he delegate to the revolving door of Cubs coaches given him by the front office?

It’s likely the Chicago media will fawn over Ross the way St. Louis media did Matheny. Ross may get even more favorable treatment given his tenure as a member of the media with ESPN and his engaging personality. This will likely give Ross cover and time to learn how to manage while doing the job of manager, time that Matheny also had but failed to take advantage of due to personal shortcomings.

The reason no one knows how Ross will perform as Cubs manager is the same reason no one knew how Matheny would perform as Cardinals manager. Neither man had any experience managing big-leaguers at the time of hire. The Cubs’ decision to hire Ross is as big of a gambit as the Cards’ decision to hire Matheny.

Ross is not Matheny, and yet…

Mike Shildt's Mathenaging Set Adam Wainwright and the Cardinals Up to Fail

Adam Wainwright is an all-time great St. Louis Cardinals pitcher who needs adult supervision. This is especially true in high-stakes games. Manager Mike Shildt has shown he lacks the leadership chops to provide that adult supervision. And on Saturday at Busch Stadium, Shildt’s passivity cost the Cardinals dearly.

After putting together an average-ish cocktail of a season that was one part elite-at-home and one part awful-on-the-road, Shildt made the good decision to set Wainwright up to start NLDS Game 3 at Busch Stadium against the Braves. After staff ace Jack Flaherty shut down the Braves in a lopsided Game 5 victory, fortune smiled on the Redbirds when the Nationals knocked off the Dodgers, giving St. Louis the home-field field advantage in the NLCS and the ability to start Wainwright twice at home, if need be.

Game 2 at Busch pitted Wainwright again perhaps the best pitcher in the National League, Max Scherzer. And while Waino may not have matched Scherzer, who carried a no-hitter into the sixth, the former Cardinals ace more than held his own in the duel, allowing one run on a homer through seven innings. This is when Shildt engaged in the indefensible:  Mathenaging.

Former Cardinals manager Mike Matheny could not manage Wainwright either. Whether it’s a lack of smarts or over abundance of sentimentality, Matheny consistently left Waino in too long. He would do it when it was obvious Wainwright was injured, when it was obvious he was out of gas, or when basic managing tactics dictated removal. Shildt subscribes to the Matheny Manifesto chapter on (not) managing Wainwright. And Saturday at Busch was the third reminder of this fact since the season’s final weekend against Chicago.

The Cardinals bats had no solution for Scherzer. For the second consecutive game, the offense looked completely overmatched against Washington. They could barely muster a hit let alone a run. To say that runs were at a premium as Game 2 entered the late innings is an understatement.

The Cards trailed 1-0 entering the 8th inning. Even the feeble Cards offense might be able to scrape together one run against the Washington bullpen, which was a disaster during the season. Shildt should have been managing aggressively to keep any other Nats from crossing the plate. That was the Cards’ best shot at somehow coming back and stealing a victory.

Shildt stuck with Waino to face the strikeout-prone Micchael A. Taylor and it worked. Wainwright K’d the free swinger for the first out. Up next was Scherzer, who the Nats predictably removed for a pinch-hitter in the form of left-handed hitter Matt “Big May” Adams. Here is where Shildt went overboard with sentimentality.

Shildt did not use platoon splits to make his decision, as the following tables make clear.

2019 Platoon Splits for Adam Wainwright

Split	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS	ISO	wOBA
RHB	.262	.310	.389	.699	.127	.297
LHB	.288	.380	.503	.883	.215	.368
Diff	+.026	+.070	+.114	+.184	+.088	+.071

There was a time when Wainwright was an ace who get batters out regardless of which batter’s box they dug into. That time is gone. Wainwright’s aging arm doesn’t allow him to pitch like he once did. And while he fades, pitchers across the league are emerging with nastier and nastier arsenals. Wainwright essentially has one above-average pitch and that’s his plus curve. And while it can be effective against a left-handed batsman, it’s undeniably more potent against righties.

Career Platoon Splits for Matt Adams

Split	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS	ISO	wOBA
RHP	.273	.325	.491	.816	.218	.346
LHB	.208	.236	.371	.607	.163	.260
Diff	-.065	-.079	-.120	-.209	-.055	-.086

It’s rather remarkable how Adams and Wainwright’s platoon splits mirror one another. Waino is about as bad against left-handed hitters as Adams is against left-handed relievers. Put otherwise, letting the right-handed Wainwright face the left-handed Adams is about as favorable a matchup for the Nationals as possible. Yet that’s the matchup Shildt chose for the Cardinals.

The result of Shildt’s bad choice was as predictable as it gets in baseball. Adams reached base. Although the single was probably a best-case scenario given the amount of damage lefties have hit for against Waino this year.

It’s rather remarkable how Adams and Wainwright’s platoon splits mirror one another. Waino is about as bad against left-handed hitters as Adams is against left-handed relievers. Put otherwise, letting the right-handed Wainwright face the left-handed Adams is about as favorable a matchup for the Nationals as possible. Yet that’s the matchup Shildt chose for the Cardinals. It’s rather remarkable how Adams and Wainwright’s platoon splits mirror one another. Waino is about as bad against left-handed hitters as Adams is against left-handed relievers. Put otherwise, letting the right-handed Wainwright face the left-handed Adams is about as favorable a matchup for the Nationals as possible. Yet that’s the matchup Shildt chose for the Cardinals. 

Shildt did not relieve the fading veteran after he predictably allowed Adams to reach. Perhaps he was heartened by the fact that Adams only hit a single, even if the single was a sharply struck 101.8 mph off the bat. Shildt let Wainwright face Trea Turner, a righty, who singled weakly.

Adam Eaton, a left-handed hitter, was due up. Eaton hits righties about as well as lefties for his career, so the batter’s platoon splits did not dictate a change. But Shildt still had Waino’s platoon splits to consider and the situation. Shildt’s faith in the Matheny Manesto chapter on managing Wainwright remained unfazed. He stuck with the Proven Veteran. Eaton laced a 102.7 mph ball off the bat that shot past the diving Paul Goldschmidt and plated two runs, pushing the Nats’ lead to 3-0. 

Shildt ordered the intentional walk of Anthony Rendon. He then removed Wainwright. Presumably because the principles of Mathenaging dictate removal of Wainwright only after the team’s changes of winning have been kneecapped. 

There is no denying that Shildt is a marked upgrade over Matheny. The Cardinals won the division in no small part because of the improvements on defense and running bases due to Shildt’s approach to the game. But when it comes to in-game managing, the question of whether Shild is an improvement over Matheny is unanswered.

A manager’s job is to put his players in a chance to succeed, which helps the team’s chances to win. Shildt set Wainwright up to fail in Game 2, just as he did in NLDS Game 3 after doing the same thing in NLDS Game 3. Shildt put the opposition—not the Cardinals—in the best position to succeed. The Nationals took advantage of Shildt’s gift in a way the Braves couldn’t. 

The Cards managed to luck into a run in the bottom of the eighth. But it wasn’t enough. They lost 3-1. The Nats’ two-run 8th proved decisive. 

We’ll never know what might have happened if Shildt had pulled Wainwright earlier. And that’s the problem. Shildt’s adherence to the “let the starter lose the game” tenant of Mathenaging set up Wainwright, and by extension the Cardinals, to fail. By letting Wainwright give up two runs, Shildt cost the Cardinals a chance to win the game.

This Is The Cardinal Way

Bill DeWitt read Moneyball. DeWitt, a legacy businessman, saw the A’s model and decided to emulate it. But not the focus on free agents’ undervalued skill sets. It was the way the A’s built a competitive team on the foundation homegrown players, who were cheap due to the seniority-based salary structure in Major League Baseball’s collective bargaining agreement (CBA).

DeWitt shrewdly recognized the value of the St. Louis Cardinals brand among the team’s fan base. The fans root for the birds on the bat—not individual players, no matter how much gratitude they show via standing ovations for former Cardinals. This point was likely driven home after Albert Pujols left for the Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim and the team continued to pack in fans and generate good TV ratings while playing competitive baseball.

MLB clubs, like all professional sports franchises, are corporations out to make money. They are also measured by their competitiveness on the field. Thus, MLB clubs have two goals:  Make money and be competitive. Sometimes these goals are at odds, but there is more often than not a synergy between them.

Fans like to watch competitive teams. This means that attendance and TV ratings are higher for good teams than bad. As are merchandise and concession sales. Good teams tend to generate more revenue than bad.

You know this. I know this. DeWitt knows this. But what I have been slow to recognize is the nuance to DeWitt’s philosophy toward the Cardinals’ competitiveness and making money.

In the years since Pujols’s departure in free agency, it’s become clear that the so-called Cardinal Way has evolved. Initially articulated as a philosophy to develop cheap, homegrown talent so the Cards could afford top-dollar free agents such as Pujols, the Cardinal Way has changed. Its focus is not on winning pennants or the World Series. The Cardinal Way has become focused on DeWallet.

Today, the Cardinal Way is best summed up as this:  Hold down payroll costs while fielding a roster that is competitive enough to be in the playoff picture so that tickets get sold and TV ratings on the network of which the club has an ownership stake remain strong. If the team makes the postseason, all the better. More money. But playing in October is not the primary goal. Being just competitive enough to make money year in and year out is.

John Mozeliak and the front office have fielded teams to carry out DeWitt’s vision. From about 2009 on, the Cardinals have fielded teams that project to compete near the top of the division and be in the playoff hunt each year. The Cardinals consistently field rosters that project to win about 90 games, which places them annually in about the 85 to 95 win range.

If things break right, a division title. If things don’t, there’s enough depth to keep the bottom from falling out and to be in the postseason hunt till the last week of the season, especially with two wild-card berths to be had. Every once in a while, things will come up Cardinals and you’ll notch 100+ wins. No matter what, though, the Cardinals will generate dump trucks full of revenue. DeWallet will be satiated—so much as that’s possible.

The Cardinal Way, as it exists today, must be understood when viewing the 2019 trade deadline, which we’ll explore in more depth over the coming week. Mozeliak will shoulder the criticism. But Mozeliak is executing DeWitt’s vision, and rather well. That’s why the Cardinals will never go “all in,” no matter what the marketing, ownership, or front office tells us.

Being competitive enough to maximize revenue is The Cardinal Way. Division titles and postseason berths are secondary pursuits. With the crapshoot that is October, pennants and the World Series fall still further down the priority list.

The Cardinal Way is a perfectly understandable business model. Build your organization to maximize revenue in a projectable way while isolating the unpredictable so that it can only add to your stacks of money. But this approach can also drive fans thirsty for a return to October glory up the wall, and understandably so. 

How overrated is Luke Voit?

Last year the St. Louis Cardinals traded first baseman Luke Voit for relievers Giovanny Gallegos and Chasen Shreve. The Cards needed to bolster their bullpen, in particular on the left side. So they traded Voit, who was then blocked at first base by Matt Carpenter, for a pair of arms.

Voit has done nothing but hit since joining the Yankees. He will not participate in the All-Star Game tonight for the American League due to injury, but had a strong showing in the fan vote. This has led to criticism of the Cardinals for trading Voit. But is the criticism deserved?

Voit has hit for a .280/.393/.509 (.381 wOBA) line so far this year. Voit’s .381 wOBA ranks 19th out of 157 qualified batters in MLB at the All-Star break. By wRC+, which adjusts for park effects such as those at the hitter’s paradise that is Yankee Stadium, Voit ranks 18th. No matter how you cut the cake, Voit’s batting is elite.

Voit has hit exceptionally well, but he’s incapable of doing anything else on the field. Voit plays first base, but only in the sense that he stands near the bag with a glove on his hand with the Yankees are in the field. Voit is a terrible defender, one of the worst in MLB. 

Voit’s -10.5 fielding runs per Fangraphs ranks 155th out of 157 qualified position players. This is astoundingly bad. Calling Voit a designated hitter instead of a first baseman is an insult to the fielding abilities of other designated hitters. It’s probably more accurate to say that he’s an offensive lineman playing first base — a description reinforced by his base-running.

Voit is horrible at running the bases. He has lumbered his way to -2.6 base-running runs in the first half according to Fangraphs. That ranks 143rd out of 157 qualified hitters.

Wins Above Replacement (WAR) is an approximation of a player’s overall production on the baseball field. It combines hitting, base-running, and fielding runs produced (or lost) into one number. Voit’s great hitting, atrocious fielding, and horrible base-running combine to equal 1.6 fWAR. That ties for 57th out of 157 qualified position players. It places Voit behind players such as Marcell Ozuna (1.7), Brett Gardner (1.8), Tommy Pham (2.5), Jeff McNeil (2.5), Alex Verdugo (2.2), and Brandon Lowe (2.5). 

The comparison is of course to Paul Golschmidt. The Cardinals’ big offseason acquisition is hitting .254/.343/.426 (.330 wOBA, 106 wRC+). He has posted 1.0 fWAR to date. Even with Voit’s fielding and base-running shortcomings, he has been demonstrably better than Goldschmidt. But those shortcomings are considerable, so they have made the comparison much closer than one might have expected. So close that it’s not hard to imagine Goldschmidt finishing the season with an fWAR total close to Voit’s, if not better. Albeit at a much higher salary.

Could the Cardinals use Voit’s bat? Sure. But there’s an open question as to whether he could hit for the power he has shown while playing his home games in Yankee Stadium if he were playing his home games in Busch Stadium, which has traditionally been more pitcher friendly. Add to that Voit’s terrible fielding and awful base-running, and the margin of error for Voit’s hitting shrinks considerably, especially in the National League, which does not have the DH position by which to mitigate his flaws.

All of this is to say that Voit is overrated in the way that New York Yankees batsmen so often are. And the All-Star fan vote total reflects that. I’m happy for Voit and have enjoyed watching the highlights of his hitting feats, but that doesn’t mean Voit is an All-Star caliber all-around player. He’s not. Voit is a middle-of-the-road ballplayer when we consider every facet of the game. The Cardinals' decision to trade him was not bad, especially with Gallegos emerging as one of the game's top-tier righty relievers.

CORRECTION:

The original post incorrectly stated that Voit would be starting in the All-Star Game. This is incorrect. He is on the injured list. The post has been corrected to reflect this.