David Ross is not Mike Matheny

David Ross is not Mike Matheny.

Matheny is a former big-league catcher. Ross is a former MLB catcher. Both were highly regarded clubhouse leaders during their playing days. Matheny worked for the St. Louis Cardinals before being hired as manager and Ross worked for the Chicago Cubs (and ESPN) before throwing his hat in the ring for the Cubs’ manager job. Both former players had close relationships with the front office before pursuing the MLB manager job for the organization.

The 2011 Cardinals won the World Series and St. Louis was expected to compete for the division title in 2012 and beyond. While the 2019 Cubs failed to make the postseason, they are expected to compete for the division title in 2020 and beyond. The 2012 Cardinals had and the 2020 Cubs will have rosters deep in talent and postseason experience. Matheny inherited and Ross inherits expectations for postseason success from within their respective organizations and fans.

Managing adults I hard. Maintaining their respect while doing so is harder. Matheny was bad at managing people and this is one of the reasons the Cardinals fired him. It remains to be seen whether Ross will be good at managing people because, as best I can tell, he has never done it before.

Ross has never managed or coached at any level. Matheny coached a traveling children’s baseball team. So Matheny had more experience managing a baseball team on the day the St. Louis Cardinals hired him to manage their MLB club than Ross has on the day he becomes the Chicago Cubs manager.

Matheny wrote a manifesto while in the job of children’s ball coach. The Matheny Manifesto forbid questioning the manager. To Matheny, a probable fascist, the manager is right even when he was wrong. In other words, Matheny was never wrong in his own mind. As an anonymous Cardinals organization employee told once told Bernie Miklasz, Matheny only looks in the mirror to comb his hair.

Matheny made clear that being a so-called clubhouse leader as a player is a lot different than being the manager. Having the respect of your teammates requires a different skillset than maintaining their respect as the manager. It’s one thing to offer insight to the pitching coach or manager about how a pitcher is looking in the middle innings. It’s another thing entirely to make the decision to remove the pitcher from the game and communicate that decision to the pitcher.

Being a manager is completely different from being a player-leader. No player makes the decision about another player’s playing time. The manager makes the decisions about every player’s playing time. Those decisions impact a player’s salary and their career.

A good manager must be able to make sound strategic and tactical decisions. But that’s only part of what a good manager does. After arriving at a decision, the manager must be able to communicate the decision to the players it impacts in a way they understand and that respects them as adults and professionals. The best managers do this and maintain their players’ respect even after giving them potentially bad news. It’s fair to say that the most important parts of the managers job are those fans rarely, if ever, see.

No one knew how Matheny would perform in the area of leadership, though his history as a revered catcher was cited to as evidence that he would excel. And for several years, his leadership was trumpeted in the media as a strength. But the veneer slowly cracked and it became clear that Matheny wasn’t good at anything.

Matheny was bad at communicating with his players. He played favorites (remember “Mike guys”?). Matheny was loathe to delegate to his coaches. He couldn’t instill fundamentals in his players as a teacher. All of that came out toward or after the end of his tenure as Cardinals manager. It made fans wonder why Matheny, who proved himself over and over again a terrible strategist and tactician, kept his job as long as he did.

No one knows how Ross will perform as manager of the Cubs, especially when it comes to managing his former friends and current Cubs. Will there be Grandpa Rossy guys (Rossy grandchildren)? How will he handle strategic and tactical decisions? Will he delegate to the revolving door of Cubs coaches given him by the front office?

It’s likely the Chicago media will fawn over Ross the way St. Louis media did Matheny. Ross may get even more favorable treatment given his tenure as a member of the media with ESPN and his engaging personality. This will likely give Ross cover and time to learn how to manage while doing the job of manager, time that Matheny also had but failed to take advantage of due to personal shortcomings.

The reason no one knows how Ross will perform as Cubs manager is the same reason no one knew how Matheny would perform as Cardinals manager. Neither man had any experience managing big-leaguers at the time of hire. The Cubs’ decision to hire Ross is as big of a gambit as the Cards’ decision to hire Matheny.

Ross is not Matheny, and yet…

Mike Shildt's Mathenaging Set Adam Wainwright and the Cardinals Up to Fail

Adam Wainwright is an all-time great St. Louis Cardinals pitcher who needs adult supervision. This is especially true in high-stakes games. Manager Mike Shildt has shown he lacks the leadership chops to provide that adult supervision. And on Saturday at Busch Stadium, Shildt’s passivity cost the Cardinals dearly.

After putting together an average-ish cocktail of a season that was one part elite-at-home and one part awful-on-the-road, Shildt made the good decision to set Wainwright up to start NLDS Game 3 at Busch Stadium against the Braves. After staff ace Jack Flaherty shut down the Braves in a lopsided Game 5 victory, fortune smiled on the Redbirds when the Nationals knocked off the Dodgers, giving St. Louis the home-field field advantage in the NLCS and the ability to start Wainwright twice at home, if need be.

Game 2 at Busch pitted Wainwright again perhaps the best pitcher in the National League, Max Scherzer. And while Waino may not have matched Scherzer, who carried a no-hitter into the sixth, the former Cardinals ace more than held his own in the duel, allowing one run on a homer through seven innings. This is when Shildt engaged in the indefensible:  Mathenaging.

Former Cardinals manager Mike Matheny could not manage Wainwright either. Whether it’s a lack of smarts or over abundance of sentimentality, Matheny consistently left Waino in too long. He would do it when it was obvious Wainwright was injured, when it was obvious he was out of gas, or when basic managing tactics dictated removal. Shildt subscribes to the Matheny Manifesto chapter on (not) managing Wainwright. And Saturday at Busch was the third reminder of this fact since the season’s final weekend against Chicago.

The Cardinals bats had no solution for Scherzer. For the second consecutive game, the offense looked completely overmatched against Washington. They could barely muster a hit let alone a run. To say that runs were at a premium as Game 2 entered the late innings is an understatement.

The Cards trailed 1-0 entering the 8th inning. Even the feeble Cards offense might be able to scrape together one run against the Washington bullpen, which was a disaster during the season. Shildt should have been managing aggressively to keep any other Nats from crossing the plate. That was the Cards’ best shot at somehow coming back and stealing a victory.

Shildt stuck with Waino to face the strikeout-prone Micchael A. Taylor and it worked. Wainwright K’d the free swinger for the first out. Up next was Scherzer, who the Nats predictably removed for a pinch-hitter in the form of left-handed hitter Matt “Big May” Adams. Here is where Shildt went overboard with sentimentality.

Shildt did not use platoon splits to make his decision, as the following tables make clear.

2019 Platoon Splits for Adam Wainwright

Split	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS	ISO	wOBA
RHB	.262	.310	.389	.699	.127	.297
LHB	.288	.380	.503	.883	.215	.368
Diff	+.026	+.070	+.114	+.184	+.088	+.071

There was a time when Wainwright was an ace who get batters out regardless of which batter’s box they dug into. That time is gone. Wainwright’s aging arm doesn’t allow him to pitch like he once did. And while he fades, pitchers across the league are emerging with nastier and nastier arsenals. Wainwright essentially has one above-average pitch and that’s his plus curve. And while it can be effective against a left-handed batsman, it’s undeniably more potent against righties.

Career Platoon Splits for Matt Adams

Split	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS	ISO	wOBA
RHP	.273	.325	.491	.816	.218	.346
LHB	.208	.236	.371	.607	.163	.260
Diff	-.065	-.079	-.120	-.209	-.055	-.086

It’s rather remarkable how Adams and Wainwright’s platoon splits mirror one another. Waino is about as bad against left-handed hitters as Adams is against left-handed relievers. Put otherwise, letting the right-handed Wainwright face the left-handed Adams is about as favorable a matchup for the Nationals as possible. Yet that’s the matchup Shildt chose for the Cardinals.

The result of Shildt’s bad choice was as predictable as it gets in baseball. Adams reached base. Although the single was probably a best-case scenario given the amount of damage lefties have hit for against Waino this year.

It’s rather remarkable how Adams and Wainwright’s platoon splits mirror one another. Waino is about as bad against left-handed hitters as Adams is against left-handed relievers. Put otherwise, letting the right-handed Wainwright face the left-handed Adams is about as favorable a matchup for the Nationals as possible. Yet that’s the matchup Shildt chose for the Cardinals. It’s rather remarkable how Adams and Wainwright’s platoon splits mirror one another. Waino is about as bad against left-handed hitters as Adams is against left-handed relievers. Put otherwise, letting the right-handed Wainwright face the left-handed Adams is about as favorable a matchup for the Nationals as possible. Yet that’s the matchup Shildt chose for the Cardinals. 

Shildt did not relieve the fading veteran after he predictably allowed Adams to reach. Perhaps he was heartened by the fact that Adams only hit a single, even if the single was a sharply struck 101.8 mph off the bat. Shildt let Wainwright face Trea Turner, a righty, who singled weakly.

Adam Eaton, a left-handed hitter, was due up. Eaton hits righties about as well as lefties for his career, so the batter’s platoon splits did not dictate a change. But Shildt still had Waino’s platoon splits to consider and the situation. Shildt’s faith in the Matheny Manesto chapter on managing Wainwright remained unfazed. He stuck with the Proven Veteran. Eaton laced a 102.7 mph ball off the bat that shot past the diving Paul Goldschmidt and plated two runs, pushing the Nats’ lead to 3-0. 

Shildt ordered the intentional walk of Anthony Rendon. He then removed Wainwright. Presumably because the principles of Mathenaging dictate removal of Wainwright only after the team’s changes of winning have been kneecapped. 

There is no denying that Shildt is a marked upgrade over Matheny. The Cardinals won the division in no small part because of the improvements on defense and running bases due to Shildt’s approach to the game. But when it comes to in-game managing, the question of whether Shild is an improvement over Matheny is unanswered.

A manager’s job is to put his players in a chance to succeed, which helps the team’s chances to win. Shildt set Wainwright up to fail in Game 2, just as he did in NLDS Game 3 after doing the same thing in NLDS Game 3. Shildt put the opposition—not the Cardinals—in the best position to succeed. The Nationals took advantage of Shildt’s gift in a way the Braves couldn’t. 

The Cards managed to luck into a run in the bottom of the eighth. But it wasn’t enough. They lost 3-1. The Nats’ two-run 8th proved decisive. 

We’ll never know what might have happened if Shildt had pulled Wainwright earlier. And that’s the problem. Shildt’s adherence to the “let the starter lose the game” tenant of Mathenaging set up Wainwright, and by extension the Cardinals, to fail. By letting Wainwright give up two runs, Shildt cost the Cardinals a chance to win the game.

This Is The Cardinal Way

Bill DeWitt read Moneyball. DeWitt, a legacy businessman, saw the A’s model and decided to emulate it. But not the focus on free agents’ undervalued skill sets. It was the way the A’s built a competitive team on the foundation homegrown players, who were cheap due to the seniority-based salary structure in Major League Baseball’s collective bargaining agreement (CBA).

DeWitt shrewdly recognized the value of the St. Louis Cardinals brand among the team’s fan base. The fans root for the birds on the bat—not individual players, no matter how much gratitude they show via standing ovations for former Cardinals. This point was likely driven home after Albert Pujols left for the Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim and the team continued to pack in fans and generate good TV ratings while playing competitive baseball.

MLB clubs, like all professional sports franchises, are corporations out to make money. They are also measured by their competitiveness on the field. Thus, MLB clubs have two goals:  Make money and be competitive. Sometimes these goals are at odds, but there is more often than not a synergy between them.

Fans like to watch competitive teams. This means that attendance and TV ratings are higher for good teams than bad. As are merchandise and concession sales. Good teams tend to generate more revenue than bad.

You know this. I know this. DeWitt knows this. But what I have been slow to recognize is the nuance to DeWitt’s philosophy toward the Cardinals’ competitiveness and making money.

In the years since Pujols’s departure in free agency, it’s become clear that the so-called Cardinal Way has evolved. Initially articulated as a philosophy to develop cheap, homegrown talent so the Cards could afford top-dollar free agents such as Pujols, the Cardinal Way has changed. Its focus is not on winning pennants or the World Series. The Cardinal Way has become focused on DeWallet.

Today, the Cardinal Way is best summed up as this:  Hold down payroll costs while fielding a roster that is competitive enough to be in the playoff picture so that tickets get sold and TV ratings on the network of which the club has an ownership stake remain strong. If the team makes the postseason, all the better. More money. But playing in October is not the primary goal. Being just competitive enough to make money year in and year out is.

John Mozeliak and the front office have fielded teams to carry out DeWitt’s vision. From about 2009 on, the Cardinals have fielded teams that project to compete near the top of the division and be in the playoff hunt each year. The Cardinals consistently field rosters that project to win about 90 games, which places them annually in about the 85 to 95 win range.

If things break right, a division title. If things don’t, there’s enough depth to keep the bottom from falling out and to be in the postseason hunt till the last week of the season, especially with two wild-card berths to be had. Every once in a while, things will come up Cardinals and you’ll notch 100+ wins. No matter what, though, the Cardinals will generate dump trucks full of revenue. DeWallet will be satiated—so much as that’s possible.

The Cardinal Way, as it exists today, must be understood when viewing the 2019 trade deadline, which we’ll explore in more depth over the coming week. Mozeliak will shoulder the criticism. But Mozeliak is executing DeWitt’s vision, and rather well. That’s why the Cardinals will never go “all in,” no matter what the marketing, ownership, or front office tells us.

Being competitive enough to maximize revenue is The Cardinal Way. Division titles and postseason berths are secondary pursuits. With the crapshoot that is October, pennants and the World Series fall still further down the priority list.

The Cardinal Way is a perfectly understandable business model. Build your organization to maximize revenue in a projectable way while isolating the unpredictable so that it can only add to your stacks of money. But this approach can also drive fans thirsty for a return to October glory up the wall, and understandably so. 

How overrated is Luke Voit?

Last year the St. Louis Cardinals traded first baseman Luke Voit for relievers Giovanny Gallegos and Chasen Shreve. The Cards needed to bolster their bullpen, in particular on the left side. So they traded Voit, who was then blocked at first base by Matt Carpenter, for a pair of arms.

Voit has done nothing but hit since joining the Yankees. He will not participate in the All-Star Game tonight for the American League due to injury, but had a strong showing in the fan vote. This has led to criticism of the Cardinals for trading Voit. But is the criticism deserved?

Voit has hit for a .280/.393/.509 (.381 wOBA) line so far this year. Voit’s .381 wOBA ranks 19th out of 157 qualified batters in MLB at the All-Star break. By wRC+, which adjusts for park effects such as those at the hitter’s paradise that is Yankee Stadium, Voit ranks 18th. No matter how you cut the cake, Voit’s batting is elite.

Voit has hit exceptionally well, but he’s incapable of doing anything else on the field. Voit plays first base, but only in the sense that he stands near the bag with a glove on his hand with the Yankees are in the field. Voit is a terrible defender, one of the worst in MLB. 

Voit’s -10.5 fielding runs per Fangraphs ranks 155th out of 157 qualified position players. This is astoundingly bad. Calling Voit a designated hitter instead of a first baseman is an insult to the fielding abilities of other designated hitters. It’s probably more accurate to say that he’s an offensive lineman playing first base — a description reinforced by his base-running.

Voit is horrible at running the bases. He has lumbered his way to -2.6 base-running runs in the first half according to Fangraphs. That ranks 143rd out of 157 qualified hitters.

Wins Above Replacement (WAR) is an approximation of a player’s overall production on the baseball field. It combines hitting, base-running, and fielding runs produced (or lost) into one number. Voit’s great hitting, atrocious fielding, and horrible base-running combine to equal 1.6 fWAR. That ties for 57th out of 157 qualified position players. It places Voit behind players such as Marcell Ozuna (1.7), Brett Gardner (1.8), Tommy Pham (2.5), Jeff McNeil (2.5), Alex Verdugo (2.2), and Brandon Lowe (2.5). 

The comparison is of course to Paul Golschmidt. The Cardinals’ big offseason acquisition is hitting .254/.343/.426 (.330 wOBA, 106 wRC+). He has posted 1.0 fWAR to date. Even with Voit’s fielding and base-running shortcomings, he has been demonstrably better than Goldschmidt. But those shortcomings are considerable, so they have made the comparison much closer than one might have expected. So close that it’s not hard to imagine Goldschmidt finishing the season with an fWAR total close to Voit’s, if not better. Albeit at a much higher salary.

Could the Cardinals use Voit’s bat? Sure. But there’s an open question as to whether he could hit for the power he has shown while playing his home games in Yankee Stadium if he were playing his home games in Busch Stadium, which has traditionally been more pitcher friendly. Add to that Voit’s terrible fielding and awful base-running, and the margin of error for Voit’s hitting shrinks considerably, especially in the National League, which does not have the DH position by which to mitigate his flaws.

All of this is to say that Voit is overrated in the way that New York Yankees batsmen so often are. And the All-Star fan vote total reflects that. I’m happy for Voit and have enjoyed watching the highlights of his hitting feats, but that doesn’t mean Voit is an All-Star caliber all-around player. He’s not. Voit is a middle-of-the-road ballplayer when we consider every facet of the game. The Cardinals' decision to trade him was not bad, especially with Gallegos emerging as one of the game's top-tier righty relievers.

CORRECTION:

The original post incorrectly stated that Voit would be starting in the All-Star Game. This is incorrect. He is on the injured list. The post has been corrected to reflect this.

Adam Wainwright needs adult supervision

A grown-up needs to manage Adam Wainwright.

The declining St. Louis Cardinals starter is made of glass. His sinew and muscle is brittle. The only person who seems unable to recognize and accept this fact is Wainwright himself. And, I suppose, the manager of the Cardinals, regardless of who that person is.

A pattern has emerged. Wainwright will notice something is wrong physically with his body. He will nonetheless continue to pitch. The injury will hurt his ability to pitch. The subpar pitching will result in the Cardinals giving up runs.

The latest piece of evidence comes from Sunday night’s loss at Wrigley Field, as relayed by stltoday.com writer Derrick Goold:

With two out in the fifth inning and the offense famished for runs, Wainwright felt he needed to get to second base on his line drive to left-center. He needed to pitch deep into Sunday’s game with the bullpen on fumes, and because the Cardinals oh, so desperately needed a win at Wrigley. Wainwright’s hamstring sprung a few steps out of the batter’s box, was sore as he slid into second, and when he tried to pitch through it, the game came undone, too. Wainwright said he could generate the same life on his pitches with his landing leg compromised. Three of the first four hitters he faced in the inning got hits, and the fourth was starter Kyle Hendricks, who dropped a bunt. Dave Bote’s RBI single snapped the tie and Kyle Schwarber’s RBI double pushed the Cubs comfortably ahead.

In the span of four batters, Wainwright’s hamstring didn’t improve and a 1-1 game became a 3-1 deficit.

“It just change[d] the whole complexion of the game, I think,” Wainwright said.

You think? After the fact? After all of the other times pitching injured, ostensibly playing the hero, hurt the Cardinals’ chances at winning? You think?

The better question is why manager Mike Shildt didn’t think of what would happen and make the decision for Wainwright.

There’s a new manager in St. Louis, but the result is the same. It seems that Cardinals managers are more interested in worshipping at the altar of Wainwright’s veteran proveyness than managing the fading star. Whether it’s Mike Matheny or Shildt, the result is the same. The St. Louis manager will allow Wainwright to play hurt.

Wainwright gets what Wainwright wants. It does not matter how it hurts the Cardinals’ chances at winning. It’s apparent that no one is able to make the adult decision for Wainwright — that he should not pitch in meaningful games for the Cards if he is physically compromised. Wainwright pitching at less than 100% hurts the Cards’ chances at winning, especially nowadays with the righty in the twilight of his career, doing all he can to be serviceable as a back-of-the-rotation starter in a game that has passed him by.

Worse still is how an injury can snowball. The injury to the part of the body that is hurting can worsen with use. Another possibility is for the injured body part to cause the player to sustain an injury elsewhere in his body due to compensating for the injured body party.

All of this is to say that there is no reason for Wainwright to play the hero, especially in 2019. His injury history is long. Waino’s body is not capable of pitching like it once was, due in no small part to his past injuries. And the 2019 Cards need every inning of quality pitching they can get.

It’s apparent that management does not see things this way. After all, Shildt declared the Cards to have five No. 1 starters in spring training when they might have one No. 3 starter, a handful of 4th and 5th starter types and Michael Wacha, who doesn’t merit a roster spot let alone tonight’s start against Miami. (Sure, the opponent is bad, but these Cards are clawing for any win they can notch and Wacha hamstrings those efforts considerably.)

With each chapter in the injury-ridden decline of Wainwright’s career it becomes clearer. There is no adult in Cardinals management who is capable of leading when it comes to the once-great Waino. Sunday night is the latest example of how the inability to manage Wainwright harms — all too often irreparably — the Cardinals’ chances of winning. This dynamic needs to change. Waino needs adult supervision.

Craig Kimbrel, Greg Holland, and the risky pursuit of free-agent relievers

The Chicago Cubs announced on Wednesday a contract with veteran reliever Craig Kimbrel for 3 years and $43 million. The Cubs’ decision to sign Kimbrel immediately brought to mind the Cardinals’ decision last March to sign veteran reliever Greg Holland. Both relievers have the veteran proveyness prized by managers such as Mike Matheny and Joe Maddon. Both relievers struggled to find a taker in the free-agent market. And both closers were past their primes when they hit free agency.

Entering the 2018 season, the Cards did not need Holland to close out games. The move was driven primarily by Matheny, who needed the crutch of a Closer to get the final three outs. If Holland had pitched the way he was projected to pitch, the righty would not have made the Cards appreciably better.

There was no reason to expect Holland to pitch as badly as he did. The Cards had every reason to believe that he would be perfectly fine. And if your manager requires the crutch of a Closer to work the 9th inning, giving him a perfectly fine reliever on a one-year deal is ideal. As it worked out, Holland joined St. Louis after a 10-day stint in the minors and was a stink bomb that stunk so badly that the signing challenged the long-espoused conventional wisdom that there is no such thing as a bad one-year contract.

Holland, and Matheny’s slavish devotion to his veteran proveyness, combined to be a factor in the Cardinals failing to make the postseason last year. The Cards finished 2 1/2 games back of the Rockies for the second wild-card berth. Holland tallied three blown saves for the Cards and two pitching “losses.” Had the Cardinals not made the “win-now” move of signing Holland, the season might very well have turned out differently. But St. Louis did sign Holland to handle ninth, the veteran pitched horribly, and the Cards missed the postseason for the third straight autumn.

This is not to say that Kimbrel will be for the Cubs what Holland was for the Cardinals. Holland entering April 2018 was not as good a pitcher as Kimbrel is entering July 2019. There is very little reason to expect Kimbrel to blow up the way that Holland did. Kimbrel is better now than Holland was then, which is why Kimbrel’s contract is for three years and $43 million while Holland’s was just one year, $13 million.

But how much better? That depends on what one makes of Kimbrel’s 2018. Kimbrel’s October struggles have been poo-pooed. But 2018 was the worst season of his career. And it’s not particularly close.

Craig Kimbrel:  2011–18

Year	IP	K%	BB%	ERA	FIP	xFIP	fWAR
2011	77	41.5	10.5	2.10	1.52	1.94	2.8
2012	62.2	50.2	6.1	1.01	0.78	0.88	3.1
2013	67	38.0	7.8	1.21	1.93	1.95	2.2
2014	61.2	38.9	10.7	1.61	1.83	2.24	2.5
2015	59.1	36.4	9.2	2.58	2.68	2.46	1.3
2016	53	37.7	13.6	3.40	2.92	3.48	1.2
2017	69	49.6	5.5	1.43	1.42	1.50	3.2
2018	62.1	38.9	12.6	2.74	3.13	3.13	1.3

Kimbrel’s two worst seasons occurred in 2016 and 2018. They are still very good, and he sandwiched them with a sterling 2017. Nonetheless, when you consider that he is entering his age-31 season, it’s not hard to deduce that 2016 and 2018 are likely indicative of the start of his decline. And that’s without even factoring in his weird postseason last October.

And so Kimbrel’s age and his most recent season’s worth of performance combine to create a grain of salt that must be ingested when reading that the veteran is a Hall-of-Famer, the greatest closer since Mariano Rivera, or one of the best relievers of his generation. While such statements are undeniably true — just look at those stats while pitching for the Braves! — they are more true about the Kimbrel that was than the Kimbrel that is.

Kimbrel was available as a free agent in June because every organization is Major League Baseball recognizes that the best of Kimbrel is in the past and the future is murky. The number of flamethrowers working their way up through the minors nowadays probably played a part as well. Why pay a premium for a past-his-prime Kimbrel when relievers who can roughly approximate his performance are within the organization right now? That’s why no team came close to offering the $100 million Kimbrel was reportedly seeking this winter. And it’s why the Cubs were able to ink the righty to a three-year contract for $43 million.

Further muddying the waters of Kimbrel expectations is the question of his MLB readiness, with Holland as a cautionary tale. St. Louis signed Holland on March 31. The veteran joined the Cardinals bullpen on April 9, after ten days tuning up in the minors. Holland then joined the Cardinals bullpen on April 9 and pitched terribly. So bad that St. Louis cut bait on him mid-season.

Following the Cardinals’ release of Holland, he signed with the Nationals and pitched well. Holland then parlayed his success in Washington into a contract with Arizona this past offseason. And Holland has pitched very well for the D-Backs this season. With the benefit of hindsight, it’s fair to speculate that Holland would have pitched better for St. Louis had he spent more time in Florida before joining the big-league bullpen.

The Cubs and Kimbrel would be wise to avoid a similar unforced error to that committed by the Cards and Holland a year ago. That’s probably why Maddon has floated three weeks as the timeframe in comments to the media. Though there’s no indication that Kimbrel has agreed with that amount of time. Even with three weeks of prep time, Kimbrel and the Cubs are in uncharted waters.

Then there’s the elephant in the room:  What if Kimbrel joins the Cubs and pulls a Holland? The Cardinals only had to stomach eating $13 million last year when they released Holland. The idea of doing so was so unappetizing that they allowed Holland to be a burden on the big-league roster for too long in the hopes that he might right the ship.

The Cubs have guaranteed Kimbrel $43 million. It’s unclear what the organization’s appetite will be for eating any portion of that salary if Kimbrel doesn’t deliver for Chicago the way that he did for his prior three clubs. Maddon may have to manage his bullpen with an expensive and ineffective reliever occupying a roster spot for an indefinite period of time.

Even if the worst outcomes are avoided, what have the Cubs achieved? The Cubs signed Kimbrel to give Maddon a reliever for the 9th inning with the type of veteran proveyness Baseball Men cherish in a Closer. I suppose the Kimbrel brand Closer gives management and fans some peace of mind, which isn’t nothing.

And if Kimbrel pitches up to reasonable expectations for his Age 31 through 33 seasons, he’ll be a fine closer. Having the Kimbrel of 2016 and 2018 over Reliever X in the 9th might make a difference in a game or two this year, and perhaps a few more in 2020 and 2021. If Kimbrel recreates the nastiness of his peak seasons, the benefit isn’t much greater. All of this is to say that, if all goes according to plan, it seems that the Cubs paid a premium for a de minimus upgrade this year and beyond. Even if the Central continues to be as competitive as it has been so far this year, it sure looks like the Cubs deployed their payroll dry powder on the smallest roster improvement possible.